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Partial acquisitions: anticipation of control offers?
Parianen Veeren
Between 1990 and 2005, 3,479 control offers were made for public U.S. targets.
In only 1.21% of these cases, the control bidder had previously established a toehold.
However, over that same period, we find a high incidence of partial acquisitions. Given
the relative rarity of toeholds, are the partial acquisitions evidence of buyers establishing
positions in anticipation of future control offers?
We examine the long-run performance of targets in partial acquisitions prior to
the transaction and find that partial acquisitions involving poorly-performing targets are
more likely to be followed by control offers. However, in over 85% of these cases, the
acquirer of control is not the same firm as the partial buyer. We find evidence suggesting
that the abnormal return at the time of the partial acquisition may be in anticipation of a
subsequent control offer. We find preliminary evidence suggesting that bidders use
substitution pricing in determining their offer premia when the control offer follows a
partial acquisition. This substitution effect holds even when the control offer occurs
between one and two years after the partial offer, and also if the control bidder is
different from the partial acquisition bidder. These results suggest that firms are adjusting
their control offer premiums in response to stock return movements that can be attributed
to prior acquisition activity.
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Partial acquisitions: anticipation of control offers?
!.INTRODUCTION
Between 1990 and 2005, SDC Platinum reported 7,289 completed mergers and
acquisitions transactions for CRSP-listed U.S. targets (see Table 1). Of these transactions,
3,548 (49 percent) were control offers1 while 3,323 were partial acquisitions. Despite the
fact that close to 50 percent of reported acquisitions involved the establishment of a stake
in another firm, only 1.21 percent of control offers involved a toehold .
The frequency of partial acquisitions coupled with the infrequency of toeholds
leads us to examine the motive for partial acquisitions. Are these partial buyers in general -
establishing an outside toehold? Anticipating a future control offer? Or, simply making
an investment in another firm?
A partial acquisition (PA) represents a unique corporate transaction - there is a
change in the ownership structure of the target firm, but the target remains an
independent entity [Akhigbe, Madura, and Spencer (2004)]. There is empirical evidence
showing that partial acquisitions have a positive valuation effect for target shareholders
around the announcement period [Akhigbe et al., (2004), Akhigbe et al., (2007)]. We
examine the sources of this positive valuation effect: was it due to merger anticipation or
revision in target stand-alone value?
1 A control offer/acquisition is defined as the first deal which leads to the bidder owning more than 50
percent of the target firm after the transaction.
" Toehold is defined as a small ownership stake in the target established by the bidder prior to the control
offer.
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The literature on partial acquisitions has tended to concentrate on toeholds. For
example, Choi (1991) defines a toehold as the accumulated position of five percent or
more of a target and finds a positively significant announcement effect on the target
firm's share value, while having a toehold increases the probability of a takeover.
In addition, Choi (1 991) finds that having a toehold allows investors to influence
management since he finds toeholds are related to management turnover and proxy
contests to replace the board of directors. According to Akhigbe et al., (2004), the benefit
of a partial acquisition to the target firm's shareholders is that it can act as a control
mechanism, reducing agency problems by increasing both monitoring and the threat of
management turnover. Lindqvist (2004b) looks at partial acquisitions as investment
strategies such as purchasing toeholds and/or outside-toeholds. Akhigbe et al., (2004)
consider partial acquisitions as a threat of complete takeover.
Both the target and bidding firms' shareholders tend to benefit from partial
acquisitions since these imply improved post-partial-acquisition performance of the target
relative to its poor performance prior to the partial acquisition [Choi (1 991)]. As such, the
announcement of the partial acquisition will increase the stock price of the target and the
bidder will then have the option to later sell the stock at a higher price, assuming there is
an improvement in the target's performance. Another option available to the partial
bidder is to subsequently take control of the target, assuming the bidder has the financial
means. Therefore, partial acquisitions are expected to increase the risk of a complete
takeover. Akhigbe, Martin, and Whyte (2007) study the characteristics affecting the
probability of a control acquisition. Their study shows that corporate partial bidders are
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more likely to subsequently acquire control of the target firm. They also find that the
probability of control acquisition is positively related to the size of the acquired stake.
Betton and Eckbo (2000) find that toehold bidders have positive cumulative
abnormal returns around the announcement of the partial acquisition but the results are
insignificant. Similar evidence is presented by Lindqvist (2004a) for bidders with
outside-toeholds.
We are not aware of any studies that compare the cumulative abnormal returns
to toehold target firms with those of outside-toehold target firms around the
announcement of the partial acquisition. We contribute to this literature by exploring
cumulative abnormal returns to both the bidders and targets in toehold and outside-
toehold acquisitions.
The literature on partial acquisitions has not yet covered the pre-acquisition
long-term market performance of partially-acquired target firms who either do or do not
subsequently experience a control acquisition, and the research herein attempts to fill this
gap. Moreover, we try to identify variables which will be useful in predicting which
partial acquisitions will be followed by a control acquisition. We additionally contribute
to the literature by investigating whether bidders of control offers following partial
acquisitions of the target firms are using substitution pricing in setting the control
premium, in the spirit of Schwert ( 1 996).
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Our results show that the CARs to target firms of toehold are higher than the
CARs to target firms of outside-toehold at the time of partial acquisitions but the
significance is marginal. We observe that there are more outside-toeholds than toeholds
and the outside-toehold bidders are more likely to be financial institutions.
We find that those partial acquisitions involving poorly-performing targets are
more likely to result in control offers. However, in more than 85% of cases, the acquirer
of control is not the same firm as the partial buyer. We also find that when the target is
subsequently taken over in the next two years, the bidders making the initial partial
acquisition are more likely to be non-financial firms. As expected, the cumulative
abnormal return at the announcement of the partial offer is positive, and higher if there is
subsequently a control offer within the next two years. We find that the abnormal return
to the target of a partial acquisition gradually decreases after the announcement if there is
no control offer in the next two years, suggesting that the abnormal return at the time of
the partial acquisition may be in anticipation of a subsequent control offer (see Figure 1).
We find some preliminary evidence suggesting that bidders use substitution
pricing (which is defined as a situation where the bidder ignores the pre-bid runup and
proceeds with the acquisition announcement with his original premium) in determining
their offer premia when the control offer follows a partial acquisition. This result holds
even when the control offer occurs two years after the partial. We find that the combined
premium to partial acquisitions and subsequent control offer is approximately the same as
the premium observed in pure control (no partial acquisition reported in the preceding
two years). Similar evidence is found for announcement cumulative abnormal returns.
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This substitution effect is also observed when the control bidder is different from the
partial acquisition bidder. These results suggest that bidding firms seeking control are
adjusting their offer premiums in response to stock return movements that can be
attributed to acquisition activity.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the related
literature. Section 3 describes the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and Section 5




In an oligopolistic market, each firm plays an important role, unlike under a
perfect competition where no single player can affect the industry through a merger
[Stigler (1950)]. Acquisition of one player by another reduces the number of players and
causes the general price in the market to increase. The implication of a merger or
acquisition in an oligopolistic market is that the general price increases will benefit not
only the bidder but also other firms in the industry. We can therefore say that in such a
market an acquisition creates an external benefit. Since rival firms will benefit at the cost
of the bidder, the latter will have a lower incentive to proceed with the merger. In this
situation, even though a merger is profitable, it may be more profitable for each firm to
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stand as an outsider [Kamien and Zang (1990)]. Lindqvist and Stennek (2001) call this
situation the insiders' dilemma. They test and support the insiders' dilemma hypothesis,
that even though a merger is profitable it does not occur. Their results suggest that when
the insiders' dilemma is high, there are fewer mergers.
Lindqvist (2004a) evaluates partial acquisition strategies and shows that having
an outside-toehold eliminates the insiders' dilemma, thereby implying that all profitable
mergers occur. Control acquisitions will benefit the target's rival firms in an oligopolistic
market, reducing the bidder's incentive to make the acquisition. By owning part of the
rival (outside-toehold), the bidder will not only benefit from the acquisition itself but also
through its fractional ownership of the rival firm. Research by Lindqvist (2004a) suggests
that holding outsider-toeholds is a signal of an anti-competitive merger.
Lindqvist (2004a) finds that over a three-day event window around the partial
acquisition announcement, the CAR to the outside-toehold target firms is 13.8 percent
and statistically significant. Around the control acquisition announcement, Lindqvist
(2004a) finds that the CARs to the outside-toehold target firms is approximately four
percent and statistically significant. This result implies that the bidder with an outside-
toehold gains, on average, an additional four percent on its holding on the outside-toehold
when he announces a control offer of the outside-toehold's rival.
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2.2 Toehold
Toeholds have advantages for both bidder and target firms. Toeholds allow the
bidder to profit from a successful takeover. If the bidder decides to take over the target
firm, having a toehold in that target will ensure that the bidder pays a higher premium on
fewer shares since he already owns a fraction of the target. Moreover, having a toehold
may allow the bidder to learn more about the target, thus leading to better decision-
making concerning any expected takeover of the target. Conversely, if a rival bidder
takes control of the target, the original bidder can profit by selling its toehold at a
premium [Betton and Eckbo (2000), Lindqvist (2004a)]. On the target firm side, toeholds
allow bidders to influence the management of the target firm to perform better by
changing management and having proxy contests to replace boards of directors [Choi,
(1991)].
Choi (1991) studies the valuation consequences of control-related outcomes that
follow toehold acquisitions. He finds that toeholds assist value-enhancing control
transfers (takeovers) including internal mechanisms like proxy fights and management
turnover. He tests three hypotheses: (1) the anticipated takeover hypothesis, where the
announcement effect of a toehold is expected to be positive and post-toehold performance
is expected to be negative if there is no control, implying incorrect expectations about the
takeover, (2) the control transfer hypothesis, where the announcement effect of a toehold
is expected to be positive since it is expected to increase management efficiency through
takeover and internal transfer of control, and (3) the undervaluation hypothesis, which
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implies that the toehold acquirer has private information or superior security analysis
skills.
While Choi's (1991) results support the anticipated takeover hypothesis and the
control transfer hypothesis, the results do not support the undervaluation hypothesis. He
finds that toehold targets which are followed by a control acquisition exhibit an abnormal
increase in share value while toehold targets which are not followed by a control exhibit
an abnormal decrease in share value. This finding implies that the positive announcement
effect of toehold reflects the expected advantages of subsequent control transfers. He also
finds that prior to the toehold announcement, the target firms have negative abnormal
returns, implying that poor performance and/or management inefficiency promote
toehold acquisitions which are expected to bring value-enhancing control transfer.
Betton and Eckbo (2000) study the impact of premiums and toeholds on
outcome probabilities and expected payoffs over the period 1971-1990. In their sample,
approximately half of the initial bidders have a toehold. The prevalence of toeholds in
their sample is due to the inclusion of the 1980's. They find that the greater the bidder
toehold, the lower the probability of competition. They show that rivals bids arrive
quickly, usually within 1 5 days, and they generate substantial bid jumps. At the time of
the initial bid, they find that each of the offer premium and the toehold size increases the
probability of a successful single-bid contest. In their sample, toeholds are largest in
successful single-bid contests and smallest in multiple-bid contests. The abnormal returns
to successful target shareholders are large and significant, and higher in multiple-bid
contests compared to single-bid contests. Moreover, the abnormal returns are highest if
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the initial bidder takes control of the target. The offer premium in successful deals is
higher in single-bid contest than in multiple-bid contests. They find that the toehold size
is negatively correlated with the target firm's resistance. Lower bid premiums as well as
lower pre-bid target stock price runups are associated with greater bidder toeholds. While
target shareholders' expected payoff is positively related to the bid premium and
probability of competition, the expected payoff is negatively related to the bidder's
toehold.
2.3 Partial Acquisition
Roy (1988) uses a stylized model based on the accounting notion of measuring
the profitability of targets separately from that of bidding firms. This method allows one
to differentiate the marginal cash flows due to synergy accruing to the target from the
acquirer. This synergy can be created by a cooperative arrangement, which usually
requires buying some stock of the target firm. His work shows that from a profit
maximization point of view, it is usually optimal to partially acquire a target. As such, the
bidder's gain is a function of the percentage acquired and the offer price. While Roy
(1988) uses cash as the financing method, he claims that using stock or mixed financing
should not alter the optimal acquisition fraction since all financing methods are
comparable from an economic point of view.
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Akhigbe et al., (2004) study the impact of a partial acquisition (restructuring) by
studying the target over time. They find a significant and positive valuation effect around
the initial announcement of the partial acquisition but find no evidence of long-term
underperformance. As such, the results do not support the hypothesis that partial
acquisitions will increase long-term performance due to an increase in discipline of target
management.
Akhigbe et al., (2007) find that targets of partial acquisition experience positive
announcement effects and that the gains are greater for those target firms which
subsequently become acquisition targets. Moreover, they find that partial acquisitions by
corporate bidders are more prone to result in a full acquisition. They also find that the
runup is negatively correlated with the three-day cumulative abnormal return, consistent
with Choi (1991).
2.4 Markup and Substitution Pricing
Schwert (1996) studies the relationship between the pre-announcement runups
(price changes prior to the announcement of an acquisition) and the premium in takeover
bids. He focuses on the cause of runups and their effect on the total control premium. For
instance, if the market is efficient, then a price increase implies good news about the
value of the stock. If the bidder is ready to pay a premium for a target, it must have some
information that is not incorporated in the stock price before announcement. Schwert
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(1996) questions whether the bidder ignores the runup and proceeds to the announcement
with the original premium or adjusts the premium upward to match the runup.
According to the substitution hypothesis, if the bidder ignores the runup and
continues with the unadjusted premium, then the markup (post-announcement increase in
the target's stock price) will be lower by the amount of the runup. This reduction occurs
because each dollar of the runup offsets the markup one-for-one. According to the
markup pricing hypothesis, the bidder will revise its valuation of the target firm's stock
since it has incomplete information. Thus, the final deal price will be higher due to the
runup. Now, if the markup is held constant then each dollar of the pre-bid runup is added
into the final deal price one-for-one. Schwert's (1996) results support the markup pricing
hypothesis; that is, in successful mergers and tender offers, the markup is unrelated to the
size of the price or volume runups. His results show that the pre-runup and the markup
are not correlated. Moreover, the CARs for successful offers on the announcement date
are higher than those for unsuccessful offers, suggesting that the market can partially
predict the probability that the target shareholders will receive a control premium. While
the CAR for successful takeovers drifts upwards after the announcement, those for the
unsuccessful offers drift back down to zero.
11
2.5 Acquisition
Jensen and Ruback (1983) find evidence indicating that corporate takeovers
create value. While the target firm shareholders benefit, the bidding firms do not lose.
Their results suggest that benefits are realized only when wealth transfers occur - that is,
only for successful bids. They classify the sources of gains from acquisitions into
synergies, financial motives, increased market power, and changes in inefficient target
management. Synergies can take the form of economies of scale, more efficient
production or organizational technology, increased utilization of the bidder's
management team, and the reduction of agency costs by bringing organization-specific
assets under common ownership. Synergies can also be achieved through vertical
integration. Financial motivations include underutilized tax shields, avoidance of
bankruptcy costs, and increased leverage. They conclude that managerial teams compete
for the rights to manage corporate resources.
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) investigate the rationale behind interfirm tender
offers by examining the returns realized by the stockholders of firms that were targets of
successful tender offers and those of unsuccessful offers. They find positive abnormal
returns to both targets and bidders, consistent with the synergy hypothesis. The synergy
hypothesis predicts that the target stockholders experience an increase in wealth only if
there is a transfer of control of their firm to another firm. Their results also support the
information hypothesis whereby the abnormal returns imply that the target was
previously undervalued or that the acquisition announcement allows the target
management to implement a higher-valued operating strategy. If the information
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hypothesis holds, the target firm shareholders are expected to realize significant positive
abnormal returns with the announcement of the tender offer and if the offer is
subsequently rejected, the share price is not expected to drop back to its pre-offer level.
While Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) find that the share prices of unsuccessful targets
fall back to pre-offer levels within five years, the share prices of successful targets
experience additional significant positive revaluation. These results are more consistent
with the synergy hypothesis than the information hypothesis. They also find that if the
tender offer is rejected, there is a positive revaluation of the target anticipating a future
successful acquisition bid.
In addition, Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) find that tender offers increase the
combined value of target and bidder firms by an average of 7.4 percent. Their results
show that competition among bidding firms increases the returns to targets firms but
decreases the returns to acquirers. Finally, they find that in multiple-bidder acquisitions,
the total synergistic gains are larger.
3. HYPOTHESES
In the literature, there is evidence that the announcement effect of partial
acquisitions and control acquisitions on the target firms' shareholders is positive
[Akhigbe et al., (2007), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983)]. Consistent with the literature,
we hypothesize that the announcement effect of partial acquisitions and control
acquisitions for the different samples and subsamples to be positive to the target firms"
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shareholders. For definitions of various samples and subsamples, please refer to the
samples description in Appendix A.
If the market can predict, on average, which partial acquisitions will or will not
be followed by control acquisitions then we would expect PFC to have a more positive
announcement effect than PP. Therefore, we hypothesize that the announcement effect of
partial acquisitions to target firms' shareholders will be higher for PFC than for PP.
Moreover, we expect that the announcement effect of partial acquisitions to be more
positive to the target shareholders of PFCl than PFC2 because if the market can predict
which partial acquisitions will be followed by control acquisitions, then the market is
more likely to correctly forecast earlier control offers. In addition, we also expect the
announcement effect of control acquisitions on the target shares of PFClC to be lower
than that of PC because a portion of the control announcement effect was anticipated at
the time of the partial acquisition in the case of PFClC.
We hypothesize that the abnormal returns to PP will decline after the partial
acquisition if the abnormal return was in anticipation of a future takeover and remain
constant if the source of the gain was a revaluation of the stand-alone value of the target.
This is similar to Bradley et al., (1983).
While Akhigbe et al., (2007) suggest that partial acquisitions made by financial
bidders are negatively related to control takeovers, they do not provide any further
details. Given the large number of partial acquisitions, we expect a significant number of
these partial acquisition bidders to be financial institutions. We expect financial bidders
to be less likely to go for control and more likely to make partial acquisitions in
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anticipation of future control offers. This is because their objective is not to take control
of the target but rather they expect the target to be taken over by another firm. Therefore,
we hypothesize that there are more financial bidders at the time of partial acquisitions
than at the time of control acquisitions. We also hypothesize that there are more financial
bidders in PP than in PFC if PP long-term pre-announcement stock performance is better
than that of PFC. The reasoning is as follows. If the target has good stock performance
prior to the announcement of partial acquisition (implying lower risk) and since financial
bidders do not enjoy as much synergy as non-financial bidders, it is in their advantage to
invest in such firms. Furthermore, the announcement effect of partial acquisitions to the
target shareholders will be lower if the bidder is a financial institution because financial
bidders are less likely to offer high premium [Dittmar, Li, and Nain (2008)] as they do
not enjoy the potential synergy gains.
Since financial bidders invest in less risky companies (for reasons mentioned
above) we hypothesize that the long-term performance of PP prior to the announcement
to be better than that of PFC. In addition, we hypothesize that the long-term performance
of PC prior to the announcement is better than that of PFClC and PFC2C. The reasoning
behind this hypothesis is that if target firm performance has been good then there is less
risk in taking control of this target.
If the long-term performance prior to the announcement of PP is indeed different
from that of PFC then we make the further hypothesis that PFC is a function of prior
performance.
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We hypothesize that the expected abnormal return to toehold target shareholders
is different from that of outside-toehold target shareholders around the announcement of
the partial acquisitions. For instance, if the market can differentiate an outside-toehold
transaction from a toehold transaction, then we expect the latter to have higher CARs.
This is because the benefit to toehold target shareholders will be higher when the bidder
will make the control offer. Following the same rationale, we hypothesize that the
expected abnormal returns to the outside-toehold target shareholders to be higher
compared to that of non-outside-toehold target shareholders in the PP sample.
On the bidder side, we hypothesize the bidders of PFCC to experience a more
positive announcement effect compared to bidders in PC. This follows from the
assumption that the partial acquisition is a signal of a future control acquisition.
Therefore, the control announcement effects will be lower for target firms of PFCC since
it is anticipated, thus implying better CARs for bidders of PFCC compared to bidders of
PC.
Since the outside-toehold bidders are expected to gain at the announcement of
the control offer of a rival target, we hypothesize a more positive (or less negative effect)
announcement effect to these bidders compared to those non-outside-toehold bidders in
PC around the time of control offers. The rationale is as follows. If we assume the bidder
has a negative CAR at the announcement of the control offer (to control rival target) then
on the outside-toehold target side, we expect a positive effect upon the announcement of
the control offer of its rival [Lindqvist (2004a)]. Since the bidder has an outside-toehold,
he will benefit from that holding/investment. Moreover, we expect the bidder of the
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toehold to have better CARs than the bidder of the outside-toehold at the announcement
of control offer because of the direct relation in toehold compared to outside-toehold.
Following Schwert (1996) rationale, if bidders of PFCC consider substitution
pricing in setting the premium of control offers, then the premium of PFCC should be
lower than that of PC. For example, bidder A determines his valuation of the target and
the premium that he will pay assuming he makes a control offer. If there is a partial
acquisition of the target before the announcement of control offer by A, we expect the
stock price of the target to rise. If bidder A uses substitution pricing, then the premium he
wants to pay will not change in dollar amount but will fall in percentage terms. To test if
PFCC bidders are using substitution pricing, we hypothesize that the PC premium
(CARs) is greater than the PFCC premium (CARs) - in other words, the sum of PFC
premium (CARs) and PFCC premium (CARs) will be equal to the premium (CARs) of
PC.
4. DATA
The data used in this study is from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC)
Platinum and the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases. The deal
announcements are from SDC Platinum and the stock returns are from CRSP. From 1990
to 2005, there were 35,336 deals announced in the U.S. where the targets are public
companies. After dropping the targets with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 inclusive
and between 9000 and 9999 inclusive, representing financial firms and public
administration firms respectively, the sample size is reduced to 25,180. Removing
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repurchases and self-tender further reduces the sample to 15,161 announcements. From
this sample, there are 11,043 completed deals. We then require firms to be listed on
AMEX, NASDAQ or NYSE and this criterion reduces the sample size to 8,607. We are
able to identify only 7,289 of these target firms in CRSP. Table 1 summarizes the sample
construction process.
Of the 7,289 observations, 3,323 or 45.59% were partial acquisitions, that is,
deals where the bidder owns less than 50 percent of the target after the transaction. This
definition of partial acquisition does not differentiate a transfer of ownership from one
blockholder to another blockholder. As long as SDC reports a deal where ownership of
the target firm by the bidder is less than 50 percent of target firm after the transaction, we
consider this deal as a partial acquisition. We treat deals where the bidder was seeking
control but owns less than 50 percent after the transaction as partial acquisitions.
4.1 Pure Partial
We define the Pure Partial (PP) as a deal where there is a partial acquisition of a
target and that neither partial nor control acquisitions for this target occur within the
following two years. This requirement means there was neither announcement of partial
acquisition nor announcement of control acquisition for the target firm within 520
business days from the announcement date of the partial acquisition under analysis. We
exclude deals occurring in 1990 (in order to remove any deals with confounding events in
the year prior to the announcement) and in 2004 and 2005 (in order to confirm the
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subsequent two years of inactivity). In addition, ten deals were dropped as the target and
bidder have a common ultimate parent. After excluding 49 observations with
confounding events, the final sample consisted of 1 ,430 deals.
Figure 1 - Pure Partial Timeline
-1 year t - 0 +2 years
Pure Partial
< ? m ?
No confounding event No acquisition announcement
4.2 Partial Followed by Control
Wc define partial followed by control (PFC) as a deal where within two years
(520 business days) after the announcement of the partial acquisition, the target is the
subject of a successful control acquisition. In order to identify partial acquisitions that are
followed by control offers, we once again exclude deals in 1990, 2004, and 2005 for the
same reasons outlined in the pure partial sample construction. Based on these criteria, we
have a sample of 364 observations. We also drop 60 cases where the control acquisition
occurs \vithin 40 trading days of the partial acquisition as we assume that these two
transactions are sufficiently close in time to be considered part of the same transaction.
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Thirteen cases were also dropped as the target and bidder had the same ultimate parent.
After excluding 55 observations containing confounding events from 1992 to 2003, the
final sample consists of 236 observations.
PFCl is a sub-sample of PFC with 125 observations where the control
acquisition (CA) occurs in the first year and PFC2 is a subsample of PFC consisting of
1 1 1 observations, is where the CA occurs in the second year after the partial
announcement (see Table 2). We also consider the valuation effects at the control offer
following the partial in following three subsamples - PFCC (the control offer following
the partial), PFClC (the control offer within one year of the partial) and PFC2C (the
control offer within the second year after the partial).
Figure 2 - Partial Followed by Control Timeline
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The control sample - the deals that result in the bidder owning more than 50
percent of the target after the transaction - consists of 3,479 observations. The Pure
Control (PC) sample is obtained by dropping observations where the targets experienced
a partial acquisition within two years (520 business days) prior to the announcement of
the control acquisition. This reduces the sample size to 3,014. To ensure that these targets
did not have any partíais two years before the control bid, we drop observations prior to
1992 (174 observations). Once again, we drop 95 observations where the target and the
bidder share the same ultimate parent, resulting in a final sample of 2,745 deals (see
Table 2).








In order to determine if any observed effects at the announcement of the partial
are actually due to the partial or are part of the anticipation of the subsequent control
offer, we create a Virtual PFC (VC) sample. This sample is a set of pseudo-partial dates
determined by taking the distribution of days prior to a control acquisition observed in the
PFC sample and using that distribution to assign a partial acquisition announcement date
to the pure control deals. Then we select those only in the second year by choosing the
deals where the number of days between the pseudo-partial and control is between 261
and 520 days, inclusively. Our VC sample consists of 1,287 observations. VC has the
same distribution of differences in days between PA and CA as PFC2 (see Figure III).
4.5 Toehold Partial Acquisitions
We identify the toeholds, defined earlier as a deal when a bidder buys less than
50 percent of a target firm before making a control offer to the same target at a later
period, by comparing the bidders of PFC to those of PFCC. If the bidders have the same
CUSIP, meaning the bidder who makes the partial acquisition is that making the control
offer, then we classify the observation as a toehold. We have 33 observations of toehold
after excluding confounding events (Table 2).
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4.6 Outside-toehold
To identify the outside-toeholds in the samples, we merge PFC with PC and
PFCC by acquirer CUSIP and investigate if any of the control bidders completed partial
acquisitions in the previous two years in the same industry (defined by the two- and
three-digit SIC codes). We drop cases where the target of the partial acquisition is the
same as the target of the control acquisition since these are not outside-toeholds. In our
final PFC sample, there are 75 outside-toeholds based on two-digit SIC codes and 49
outside-toeholds based on three-digit SIC codes. We replicate these steps with the PP
sample and our final PP sample consists of 325 (138) outside-toeholds based on two-
(three-) digit SIC codes.
4.7 Bidder
From the 8,607 completed deal observations, we were able to identify only
2,598 U. S public bidders in CRSP. We then merge each of the samples discussed above
with those 2,598 observations to find the sample of bidders. B_PFC contains the same
deals as those in the PFC sample, except that we now consider the bidders instead of the
targets. We were able to identify 55 such observations in CRSP. The sample size is
smaller since there are more private bidders in partial acquisitions. B_PFCC is the
sample of bidders for PFCC with 156 observations, B_PC is the sample of bidders for PC
with 1,364 observations, and B_PP is the sample of bidders for PP with 137
observations.
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To identify the outside-toehold bidders at the time of the control acquisitions, we
take the following steps. Of the 8,607 (see Table 1) observations, 3,855 are partial
acquisitions. In only 463 cases, we are able to identify the U.S. bidders in CRSP. We then
merge the 156 BPFCC and 1,364 BPC with these 463 observations of U.S. partial
bidders by bidders' PERMNO. We consider only cases where the first two-digit of the
SIC codes of the target firms at the partial acquisitions are equal to those at the control
acquisitions. This criterion reduces the sample to 289 observations. We then consider
observations where the number of business days between the partial acquisition and the
control acquisition is at most 520 days (two years) and drop ten duplicate observations.
Our final sample consists of 58 bidder observations, of which 23 are toehold partial
acquisitions and 35 are outside-toehold partial acquisitions.
5. METHODOLOGY
5.1 Event Study
In order to determine the effect of partial and control acquisitions, we conduct
event studies where the event of interest is the announcement of the partial/control
acquisition3. If the market is efficient, there will be a price reaction to this announcement.
If the market considers the announcement as good news then there will be a positive price
reaction (implying positive stock returns); otherwise, there will be a negative price
reaction (implying negative stock returns). Because we do not know what the stock return
This description of an event study methodology is from MacKinlay (1997).
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would be if the event did not happen, we cannot merely consider a firm's actual stock
return as a true indication of the impact of the event. We thus rely on the estimation, via
standard event study methodology, of the abnormal return to the firm at the
announcement. More specifically, we use the market model or the market-adjusted model
(when it is not feasible to get the pre-event estimation) to estimate the expected returns of
the stock assuming the event does not take place. Each of these approaches will be
discussed in turn.
5.1.1 Market Model
The market model assumes a linear relationship between the market returns and
the stock returns, based on parameters estimated by OLS.
Rit = at + ßtRrra + elt, O)
E(Eit) = O, var(.£it) = < (2)
where, Rit = the return from sample firm i on day t
Rmt = the return from the market index on day t
In equation (1), au /?¿ and a£t are the parameters of the market model estimated
for each firm using daily or monthly (depending on the specific hypothesis being studied)
returns prior to the event date. The CRSP equally-weighted index is used as the market
index return. Once we have the parameters of the market model, we calculate the
expected return for each firm as follows:
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E(RiT) = at +ßiRmr (3)
5.1.2 Market-Adjusted Model
This model assumes that the expected return to the firm is equal to the returns on
an index for that period (day or month):
E(Ru) = Rmr (4)
We use the CRSP equally-weighted index as the market index. Once we have
the expected returns, we subtract them from the actual returns in order to estimate the
abnormal returns.
ARiT = RiT - E(RiT) (5)
The abnormal return is the difference between the actual return and the expected
return. We compute the CAR by first summing the abnormal returns over time for each
firm in the sample and then averaging across firms. These CAR s can be tested for
statistical significance and we use the Patell Z to test whether the CARs are significantly
different from zero.
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5.1.3 Testing Abnormal Returns
The Patell Z standardizes each abnormal return by an estimator of its own
standard deviation and then sums these standardized abnormal returns across firms and
across time if the event window is more than one period. This method takes into account
that we often do not have stock returns for all the firms over the entire estimation period.
By standardizing each abnormal return, the Patell method accounts for the number of
stock returns available in estimation period .
We also use the non-parametric generalized sign test. This test is based on the
ratio of positive to negative abnormal returns during an event window. We use the t-test
and the Wilcoxon signed rank test to test the significance of the differences in mean and
median CARs and offer premiums, respectively.
Using the EVENTUS software, we estimate the daily mean cumulative
abnormal return (CARs) for various intervals around the announcement date to measure
the announcement effect of partial and control acquisitions. The market model was used
to estimate the expected returns. The estimation period ends 21 days before the
announcement (event) date and consists of a maximum of 240 days and a minimum of
100 days. The CAR is the cumulated difference between the actual returns and the
expected returns estimated under the market model. The following event windows were
used: (-1,0), (0,+ l), (0,0), (-1,+ I), (-3,+3), (-5,+5), and (-10,+ 1O) for all samples and
subsamples. The results are reported in Table 3.
For more details concerning the Patell Z please refer to the Eventus user's guide, available from
http://www2.ondemandmanuals.com/cowan
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Furthermore, we examine the target monthly cumulative abnormal returns from
three months prior to the partial announcement up to 12 months after the announcement
month for the PP, PFC2, and VC samples in order to test the hypothesis that the abnormal
return to the announcement of the partial was due to merger anticipation. This approach
is similar in spirit to Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) who test whether merger gains are
due to expected synergies or target revaluations. The market model was used to estimate
the expected returns and the estimation period ends six months before the announcement
(event) date and consists of a maximum of 60 months and a minimum of 36 months. The
results are reported in Figure I.
We identify the financial bidders by their SIC codes, and we use dummy
variables to classify bidders into financial and non-financial. Every bidder with SIC
codes between 6000 and 6999 from SDC is considered to be a financial bidder and the
financial bidder dummy variable takes on the value of one. This definition of financial
bidder does not distinguish the different types of financial bidders such as venture
capitalists, hedge funds, mutual funds, etc. We use the proportion test to examine whether
the proportion of financial bidders in partial acquisitions (PP+PFC) is equal to the
proportion of financial bidders in the control acquisition sample. We then test if the
proportion of financial bidders in PP is equal to the proportion of financial bidders in
PFC. The results are reported in Table 4. We then test the differences in mean and
median CARs between financial bidders and non-financial bidders in the PP, PFC, and
PC samples over the various event windows. The results are reported in Table 5.
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We use regression analysis to test if PFC and the existence of financial bidders
explain part of the cumulative abnormal returns. Following Basu, Dimitrova and Paeglis,
(2009) we use the following control variables:
(1) percentage acquired,
(2) stock, which is a dummy variable taking the value of one if stock was used
as a medium of exchange and zero otherwise,
(3) firm size, which is the natural logarithm of market capitalization of the
target, which is calculated by multiplying the number of shares outstanding with the
firm's stock price 60 days prior to the announcement (see Table 6).
We use the methodology of Choi (1991) to analyze the target firm's
performance prior to the partial acquisition. We estimate the CAR from month -60 to
month +3, where month 0 is the announcement month. This approach is similar to that of
Choi (1991) except that we use the market-adjusted model, where the abnormal returns
are the difference between actual returns and market returns. Since we are looking at five
years prior to the announcement date, we have to drop many more observations if we use
the market model due to confounding events in our estimation period. Moreover, if we
use the market model, we will need at least five more years of stock returns prior to the
beginning of the event window. Therefore, we need more than ten years of stock returns
which would significantly reduce the size of our sample. Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain
(2009) use the market-adjusted method for a similar reason. The results are reported in
Figure IV for partial acquisitions and in Figure V for control acquisitions.
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We do a crude test using the market adjusted model to estimate priorCARs, that
is, prior stock performance (CAR from 60 month to one month prior to the
announcement) as an independent variable in a logit regression to predict PFC. Following
Basu, Dimitrova and Paeglis, (2009) we control for firm size by using the natural
logarithm of market capitalization of the target, determined 60 days prior to the
announcement. The results are reported in Table 7.
5.2 Outside-toehold
We create a dummy variable named OT2 (OT3) which is equal to one if the
partial acquisition of the target is an outside-toehold based on two- (three-) digit SIC
codes and zero if the acquisition is a toehold. We use this variable as an independent
variable and the cumulative abnormal returns over the window (-1,+ I) as the dependent
variable to test if the difference in CARs is significantly higher for toehold target firms
compared to outside-toehold target firms. We expect the coefficient estimates of OT2
(OT3) to be negative. Following Basu, Dimitrova and Paeglis, (2009) we use the
following control variables:
(1) percentage acquired,
(2) firm size, which is the natural logarithm of market capitalization of the
target, which is calculated by multiplying the number of shares outstanding with the
firm's stock price 60 days prior to the announcement (see Table 8).
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We use the outside-toehold dummy variable described in the Data section as the
independent variable and the cumulative abnormal returns over the window (-1 ,+ 1) as the
dependent variable to test if the outside-toeholds have higher CARs than non-outside-
toehold in the PP sample. Following Basu, Dimitrova and Paeglis, (2009) we control for
percentage of shares acquired and firm size. The results are reported in Table 9.
5.3 Bidder
An event study similar to the one described earlier is performed to determine the
effect of acquisition announcement on the bidders' firm value. We use the market model
and daily returns with the sample criterion employed earlier in the target samples. We
have four samples BPFC, BPP, BPFCC, and BPC with 55, 137, 156 and 1364
observations, respectively. The results are reported in Table 10.
We merge the output file from Eventus, which contains the bidder CARs over
the different windows, with the file containing toeholds and outside-toeholds to obtain
the returns for the toehold and outside toehold bidders. We are able to identify only 22
observations where the bidders have a toehold and 34 observations where the bidders
have an outside-toehold. From the BPC sample, we classify those observations without
an outside-toehold as BPCnon-outside-toehold. We use this data in Stata to calculate
the mean and median CARs of the different samples and over the different windows. We
use the t-test to calculate the significance of the CARs. In order to calculate the
significance of the difference in mean and median CARs between bidders with toehold
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and bidders with outside-toehold, we use the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed rank test,
respectively. The same procedures and test statistics are used to calculate the difference
in mean and median CARs between bidders with outside-toehold and those without
outside-toehold in the PC sample. The results are reported in Table 1 1 .
5.4 Substitution Effects
As discussed earlier, if bidders are using substitution pricing then the sum of the
premium paid to the target shareholders of PFC and PFCC at time of partial acquisitions
and control acquisitions, respectively, should not be different from that paid to the target
shareholders of PC at time of control acquisitions. Moreover, the combined cumulative
abnormal returns to PFC and PFCC target shareholders at time of partial acquisitions and
control acquisitions should not be different from that of the PC target shareholders at the
time of control acquisition. We use the one-week offer premium from SDC (the premium
based on the price seven days before the announcement) to test the differences in mean
and median premium between the PC sample and the sample which combines the
premium of the PFC and PFCC. We then test the differences in mean and median CARs
(calculated from the previous section) over the window (-1,+I) between the PC sample
and the sample which combines the premium of the PFC and PFCC. We use the t-test to
test the differences in means and the Wilcoxon signed rank test to test the differences in
medians.
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Betton and Eckbo (2000) calculate the offer premium by deducting the P.6o (the
price 60 days prior to the announcement date) from P0 (the price on the announcement
date) and divide the difference by P.6o- We use this method as an additional robustness
test. For the PFCC sample, the P.6o is measured relative to the announcement date of the
partial (PFC) and to be consistent, we use the VC sample to calculate the P-60 for the pure
control subsample. Therefore, in the PC sample the P_6o is not exactly 60 days prior to the
announcement of the control but 60 days prior to the pseudo-partial announcement date.
The results are reported in Table 12.
6. ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS
From the sample characteristics in Table 2, we observe a higher frequency of
financial bidders participating in partial acquisitions (76%) compared to control
acquisitions (21%). Moreover, there is a greater percentage of financial bidders in PP
(77%) than in PFC (69%). We observe that the use of cash as a medium of exchange is
more prevalent in partial acquisitions. We can also observe that the PFC has a higher
CAR over the window (-1,+ I) than does PP. From this table, we see that the average
offer premium based on seven days before the announcement date is higher for PP than
PFC.
In Table 2, we see that the mean (median) CAR for pure control acquisitions is
22.59% (17.93%). However, the combined mean (median) CAR for the partial and its
one year subsequent control offer [10.39% (3.34%) + 14.10% (9.83%) or 24.49%
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(13.17%)] is comparable to the mean and median CARs of pure control transaction
sample. In the case of the two-year partial followed by control the values are 4.53%
(1.90%) + 16.30% (14.26%) or 20.83% (16.16%). Once again, the CAR of the combined
partial and control is comparable to the CAR for the pure control acquisitions. These
results suggest that bidders use substitution pricing to take into account the effects of
prior acquisition attempts even when the prior attempt was up to two years before and did
not involve the control bidder. These results are tested in Table 1 2.
The CARs of the target around the announcement date are provided in Table 3.
The mean and median CARs are positive and significantly different from zero in each of
the various windows. This implies a positive announcement effect of partial and control
acquisitions on target firms. Our results are consistent with prior studies such as Akhigbe
et al., (2004) and Akhigbe et al., (2007) and support our hypothesis.
We test the differences in mean and median CARs of PP and PFC samples. In
Table 3, we see that the differences in means and medians are significant, similar to
results in Akhigbe et al., (2007). This implies that, in general, partial acquisitions which
are followed by control acquisitions have a more favourable announcement effects than
do those which are not followed by control. These results support the hypothesis that, on
average, the market can predict which partial acquisitions will and will not be followed
by control acquisitions.
Comparing the mean CARs between PFCl and PFC2, we find that the CARs of
PFCl have a higher mean than do those of PFC2 in all of the event windows. These
differences are significant at the five percent level (Table 3). However, the differences in
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medians are insignificant thus implying that PFCl has a more favourable announcement
effect than PFC2 but that the distribution of CARs is affected by outliers.
At the time of control acquisition, PFClC has a lower average CAR than PC.
The differences in means and medians are highly significant (Table 3), implying that a
control acquisition in a company with no previous partial acquisition is more favourable
than a control acquisition where the target has a history of partial acquisitions. This result
further implies that PFC 1 C are anticipated events and that part of the abnormal return is
captured at the time of partial. We will discuss this in the substitution pricing section.
We follow Bradley et al., (1983) methodology to analyze the post-partial
acquisition performance of the target (Figure I) in order to determine if the abnormal
return observed at the announcement of the pure partial acquisition is in anticipation of a
future control acquisition. Surprisingly, we observe a more favourable effect in the
announcement month for a pure partial than for partíais subsequently followed by control
offers. The CAR from three months prior to the announcement month to one year post-
announcement is an increasing function of the number of post-announcement months for
PFC2 while it is decreasing for PP. Based on these results, PFC2 appear to perform better
than PP in the post-partial acquisition period. We also observe that the monthly CAR
around the announcement month is higher for PP than PFC2. These results are consistent
with the view that part of the announcement effect ofpartial acquisitions is in anticipation
of future control offers, also is consistent with Bradley et al., (1983).
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Interestingly, upon the examination of Figure II, which divides the PP sample
into financial and non-financial bidders, we observe that the CARs to target firms are
significantly higher when the bidder is a non-financial firm. Moreover, the CARs to
target of non-financial bidder firms are an increasing function over time while those of
targets of financial bidders are a decreasing function over time. Since the number of
observations of non-financial and financial bidders are 110 and 614, respectively, the
trend in CARs to PP in Figure I is primarily driven by the financial bidders
Akhigbe et al., (2007) find that financial bidders are unlikely to go for control
acquisitions. We observe a high proportion of financial bidders in both the PP and PFC
samples. We test the difference in proportion of financial bidders between partial and
control acquisitions and find that the difference is positive and highly significant (see
Table 4). This result is consistent with Akhigbe et al., (2007), and suggests that financial
bidders participate more frequently in partial acquisitions than in control acquisitions.
The proportion of financial bidders is significantly greater in PP than in PFC, implying
that financial bidders participate more in pure partíais than in partíais that are
subsequently followed by control offers. Therefore, these results support our hypotheses.
Since our results support the hypothesis that financial bidders are more frequent
at the time of partial acquisitions than at the time of control acquisitions, we further
analyze the effect of financial bidders on abnormal returns. We test the differences in
mean and median CARs between financial bidders and non-financial bidders for the
various samples employed in this study. We find differences in means and medians are
negative and highly significant in the PP, PFC, and PC samples (Table 5). These results
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imply that when the bidder is a financial firm, the CARs to the target firms are lower
compared to that of a non-financial bidder. These results support our hypotheses and are
consistent with the literature suggesting that financial acquirers are more likely to offer a
lower premium than corporate bidders [see, for example, Dittmar, Li, and Nain (2008)].
Our results from the regression analysis (see Table 6), show the effect of both
financial bidders and PFC on CARs. We see that the cumulative abnormal returns are
lower in both partial acquisitions and control acquisition when the bidder is a financial
institution, which support our hypothesis and is consistent with Dittmar, Li and Nain
(2008). We observe that PFCs produces higher CARs than do PPs, again consistent with
the results in Table 3. At the time of the control offer, PFCC produces lower CARs than
do PCs, consistent with our results in Table 3. The coefficient estimate of the percentage
of shares acquired is positive and significant. We control for stock as a medium of
exchange around control acquisition and not around partial acquisition (because there are
only three cases in partial acquisition where stock is used as a medium of exchange). This
coefficient estimate is negative and highly significant, implying that when stock is used
as the medium of exchange in an acquisition, the benefit to target shareholders is lower.
The last control variable that we use is the size of the target, which we calculate as the
natural logarithm of market capitalization. The coefficient of this variable is negative and
significant in both the partial sample and control sample.
The long-term stock performance from Figure IV, which displays CARs from 60
months prior to the announcement month (month 0) to three months after announcement,
shows that PP perform better than the market prior to the partial acquisition, while PFC
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performance prior to the partial acquisition announcement is worse than the market. We
test the differences in average CAR from 60 months to one month prior to the
announcement month between the PFC and PP and the result is negative (-0.54 percent)
and significant at the one percent level. From this analysis, we can conclude that PP firms
have better performance prior to the partial while PFC firms underperformed prior to the
partial. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that financial bidders invest in
firms which are performing better than the market and in PP.
We conduct a similar analysis for the control acquisitions (Figure V) and we
observe that PC performs better than PFClC and PFC2C prior to the control acquisition
announcement. This is consistent with our hypothesis and implies that firms with poor
performance need some kind of monitoring [see Choi (1991)] before being a target for
CA.
The above results suggest that PFC is a function of prior CARs. The results from
the logit regression (Table 7), which tests the hypothesis that long-term stock
performance prior to the announcement of the partial acquisition can be used to predict
PFC, support our hypothesis. The negative and significant coefficient of PriorCARs
implies that targets with high stock performance are less likely to be PFCs. This result is
consistent with our previous results. We also observe the coefficient of CARs over the
window (-1,+ I) is positive and significant, which is consistent with the results in Table 3.
From Table 2, we observe that there are only 236 PFC and 1,430 PP, implying the
conditional probability of a firm being a target for control acquisition given the target had
a partial acquisition is 14.17 percent. The unconditional probability for control over that
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same period ranges from two to almost seven percent [Fig.l from Betton, Eckbo, and
Thorburn (2008)].
Our results from Table 8 support our hypothesis that outside-toehold (based on
two-digit SIC codes) target firms have lower cumulative abnormal returns compared to
that of toehold target firms around the announcement of partial acquisition but the
significance is low (significant at the 10 percent level). Using outside-toehold with three-
digit SIC codes gives us insignificant results. In this regression, we did not include a
dummy variable for financial bidders since in more than 85% of the transactions the
bidder was a financial institution. We also find that there are more outside-toeholds than
toeholds.
We do not find any significant difference between the cumulative abnormal
returns to the outside-toehold target firms and the cumulative abnormal returns to non-
outside-toehold target firms in the PP sample. These results are reported in Table 9.
In our sample, bidders of partial acquisitions do not have significant cumulative
abnormal returns around the announcement of the partial acquisitions. Bidders of control
acquisitions have negative and significant CARs around the announcement of control
acquisitions (see Table 10). In general, bidders of PC have lower CARs than bidders of
PFCC but the differences in CARs are insignificant.
Around the announcement of control acquisitions, bidders with toehold and
outside toehold do not have significant abnormal returns. The difference in CARs
between bidders with toehold and bidders with outside-toehold around the announcement
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of control acquisitions are insignificant. In the BPC sample, the difference in CARs
between bidders with outside-toehold and bidders without outside-toehold are
insignificant (see Table 1 1).
Unlike the results in Schwert (1996), our results support the substitution
hypothesis — that is, bidders in control acquisitions where the target had a partial
acquisition within the last two years offer a lower premium to the target shareholders at
the time of the control acquisition. From Table 12, we observe an insignificant difference
in the mean and little significance in the median cumulative abnormal returns between
the PC sample and that of the combined sample of PFC and PFCC. These results imply
that the abnormal returns to PC target shareholders are not different from the combined
abnormal returns to PFC and PFCC target shareholders. The offer premium (one-week
premium, which is based on the price seven days before the announcement) to PC
shareholders is not significantly different for the combined offer premium (one-week
premium) to PFC and PFCC shareholders. As a robustness test, we also use the offer
premium based on 60 days before the announcement and while the mean premium
supports the substitution hypothesis, the median premium does not. We have some
evidence supporting the substitution pricing hypothesis.
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7. CONCLUSION
Our results suggest that acquisitions (both partial and control) benefit target
shareholders due to the positive acquisition announcement effect. The abnormal returns
are higher for PFC than PP at the time of partial acquisition. At the time of control
acquisition, the abnormal returns of PC are higher than that of PFCC. Financial bidders
are more frequent in partial acquisitions (especially in PP) than corporate bidders. While
financial bidders are negatively correlated to the CARs, PFCs are positively correlated to
the CARs and PFCC are negatively correlated to CARs.
Prior to the partial acquisition, pure partial target firms have better performance
while those partial followed by control underperformed. Post partial acquisition,
however, the latter firms perform better than do the former.
Based on the above evidence, we see that partial acquisitions are very frequent
and appear to be in anticipation of control offers. However, these control offers rarely
materialized and are infrequently carried out by the partial bidder. Control bidders appear
to take into account the effects of prior partial acquisitions activity in setting their offer
premium.
There is some weak evidence suggesting that the announcement effect of PA is
higher for toehold targets firm than outside-toehold target firms. Concerning the
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PP PP is pure partial (i.e., no partial acquisition or control acquisition
occurs within the two years following the partial acquisition).
PC is a pure control acquisition (i.e., control acquisition where
there was no prior partial acquisition of the target within the last
two years).
PFC is partial acquisition followed control (i.e., there is a partial
acquisition followed by control acquisition within two years
following the partial acquisition).
PFCl PFCl is partial acquisition followed by a control acquisition within
a year of the partial. Subset of PFC.
PFClC PFClC is the same as PFCl but at the time of control acquisition
(i.e., the control announcement is within a year after the partial
announcement).
PFC2 PFC2 is partial acquisition followed by a control one in the second
year of the partial acquisition. Subset of PFC.
PFC2C PFC2C is the same as PFC2 but at the time of control acquisition
(i.e., the control announcement is in the second year after the
partial announcement).
Figure I. Monthly CARs from month -3 up to +12 around Partial Acquisitions
Month relative to announcement month (t=0). PP stands for Pure Partial (i.e., no partial acquisition or
control acquisition within the two years following the partial acquisition); PFC2 stands for Partial followed
by Control in the second year of the partial acquisition (i.e., partial acquisition followed by control
acquisition in the second year following the partial acquisition); VC stands for Virtual Control (which is a
subsample of PC where we assign a partial acquisition date to each observation replicating the PFC2). In









Figure II. Monthly CARs from month -3 up to +12 for PP
Month relative to announcement month (t=0). PPN-Fina stands for Pure Partial (i.e., no partial acquisition
or control acquisition within the two years following the partial acquisition) where the bidder is a non-
financial firm (110 observations); PP Fina stands for Pure Partial (i.e., no partial acquisition or control
acquisition within the two years following the partial acquisition) where the bidder is a financial firm (614
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Figure III. Distribution of PFCC and VC by Month
Month 3 is 40 days after announcement date and month 24 end 520 days after announcement date. PFCC is
partial followed by control at the time of control, (i.e., the control announcement is within two years after
the partial announcement). VC is virtual PFC, i.e., pseudo-partial dates assign to PC from the distribution
of days (second year only) between PFC and PFCC. PFC is partial acquisition followed by a control offer
(i.e., a partial acquisition followed by control acquisition within two years of the partial acquisition).
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Figure IV. Monthly CARs from month -60 up to +3 for Partial Acquisitions
Month relative to announcement month (t=0). PP stands for Pure Partial (i.e., no partial acquisition or
control acquisition within the two years following the partial acquisition): PFC stands for Partial followed
by Control (i.e., partial acquisition followed by control acquisition within two years following the partial
acquisition): VC stands for Virtual Control (which is a subsample of PC where we assign a partial
acquisition date to each observation replicating the PFC2).
<








Figure V. Monthly CARs from month -60 up to +3 for Control Acquisitions
Month relative to announcement month (t=0). PC stands for Pure Control (i.e., control acquisition where
there was no prior partial acquisition of the target within the last two years). PFClC is the same as PFCl
but at the time of control acquisition (i.e., control acquisition following a partial acquisition within a year
after the partial announcement). PFC2C is the same as PFC2 but at the time of control acquisition (i.e.,
control acquisition following a partial acquisition in the second year of the partial announcement).










Table 1. Sample Construction
1990-2005 SDC Criterion
Selection Criteria No of Deals
1990-2005 -US public targets 35,336
Dropped:
SIC 6000-6999 (Financial)
















Merge with data available in CRSP 7.289
No of observation where percentage owned after transaction is greater than 50
percent
No of observation where percentage owned after transaction is lower than 50
percent





Table 2. Sample Transaction Characteristics
PP Stands for Pure Partial (i.e., no partial acquisition or control acquisition within the two years following
the partial acquisition); PC stands for Pure Control (i.e., control acquisition where there was no prior partial
acquisition in the target in the last two years);PFC stands for Partial followed by Control (i.e., partial
acquisition followed by control acquisition within two years following the partial acquisition); PFC 1 stands
for Partial followed by Control within a year of the partial acquisition (i.e., partial acquisition followed by
control acquisition within a year following the partial acquisition); PFC2 stands for Partial followed by
Control in the second year of the partial acquisition (i.e., partial acquisition followed by control acquisition
in the second year following the partial acquisition); PFClC is the same as PFCl but at the time of control
acquisition (i.e., the control announcement is within a year after the partial announcement); PFC2C is the
same as PFC2 but at the time of control acquisition (i.e., the control announcement is in the second year
after the partial announcement). Offer premium is the premium based on the price seven days before the



















































Percentage of same bidder at
PFC and PFCC
Average percentage acquired





















Average CAR (-1,+I) 4.53 22.29 7.70 10.39 4.53 14.10 16.30
Median CAR (-1,+ I) 1.41 17.93 2.64 3.34 1.90 9.83 14.26
Average offer premium 17.76 37.17 7.33 9.32 5.08 24.34 34.93
Median offer premium 0 25.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.84 26.98
Average Deal Value ($M) 124.14 1,204.31 90.84 110.73 65.33 1,703.93 2,949.02
Table 3. Mean and Median CARs of Target Firms
The table reports mean, median and the ratio of positive to negative CARs for various event windows and various sub-
samples. The market model approach with an estimation window of (-260,-21) is used to obtain CARs. PP is pure partial
(i.e., no partial acquisition or control acquisition occurs within the two years following the partial acquisition). PFC is partial
acquisition followed by a control one (i.e., there is a partial acquisition followed by control acquisition within two years
following the partial acquisition). PFCl is partial acquisition followed by a control one within a year of the partial
acquisition. PFC2 is partial acquisition followed by a control one in the second year of the partial acquisition. PC is a pure
control acquisition (i.e., control acquisition where there was no prior partial acquisition of the target within the last two
years). PFClC is the same as PFCl but at the time of control acquisition (i.e., the control announcement is within a year
after the partial announcement). PFC2C is the same as PFC2 but at the time of control acquisition (i.e., the control
announcement is in the second year after the partial announcement). Median CARs are reported in parentheses. The ratio of
positive to negative CARs is reported in italics. The significance of the mean differences from zero is based on Patell Z tests,
while the significance of differences in means between samples is based on Mests. The significance of the median is based on
the sign test. The significance of differences on medians is based on nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank tests. The
significance of the ratio of positive to negative CARs is based on the Generalized Sign Z. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(-1,0) (0,+I) (0,0) (-1,+I) (-3,+3) (-5,+S) (-10,+1O)
pp 3 go*** 3 50*** 2 56*** 453*** 539*** 6 50*** 6.91***
(n=l,281) (0.81)*** (0.94)*** (0.47)*** (1.41)*** (2.03)*** (2.97)*** (3.80)***
741:540*** 757:524*** 723:557*** 767:514*** 765:516*** 775:509*** 775:506***
PFC 6.49*** 6.45*** 5.23*** 7.70*** 9.16*** 11.04*** 12.15***
(n=214) (1.62)*** (1.88)*** (0.74)*** (2.64)*** (3.08)*** (5.30)*** (6.04)***
132:82*** 141:73*** 130:84*** 138:76*** 140:74*** 146:68*** 144:70***
PFCl 8.91*** 9.15*** 7.66*** 10.39*** 12.55*** 14.32*** 16.40***
(n=116) (1.78)*** (2.69)*** (1.33)*** (3.54)*** (4.26)*** (5.95)*** (9.33)***
74:42*** 82:34*** 75:41*** 77:39*** 81:35*** 78:38*** 77:39***
PFC2 3.63*** 3.25*** 2.35*** 4.53*** 5.15*** 7.17*** 7.13***
(n=98) (1.06)* (1.18)* (0.48) (1.90)** (1.88)* (4.63)*** (5.36)***
58:40*** 59:39*** 55:43*** 61:37*** 59:39*** 68:30*** 67:31***
PC. 18.15*** 20.37*** 16.24*** 22.29*** 24.00*** 25.20*** 27.28***
(n=2,342) (12.10)*** (15.90)*** (9.93)*** (17.93)*** (19.92)*** (21.09)*** (23.22)***
1898:444*** 1945:399*** 1833:507*** 2007:337*** 2015:329*** 2022:322*** 1988:356***
PFClC 9.63*** 12.72*** 8.05*** 14.38*** 15.71*** 17.49*** 18.21***
(n=lll) (4.91)*** (8.96)*** (3.30)*** (11.52)*** (14.01)*** (16.21)*** (15.99)***
79:32*** 88:23*** 79:31*** 85:26*** 86:25*** 89:23*** 84:28***
PFC2C 14.34*** 16.27*** 1319*** 17.41*** 21.97*** 21.91*** 26.08***
(n=105) (10.57)*** (11.56)*** (6.00)*** (15.74)*** (20.23)*** (20.74)*** (21.06)***
73 ~32*** 80'25*** 76'29*** yj-2g*** g¡24*** 78:27*** 84:21***
Differences
PP less .2.89*** -2.95*** -2.67*** .3.17*** -3.76*** -4.55*** -5.25***
PFC (-1.81)* (-2.26)** (-2.27)** (-1.91)* (-1.80)* (-2.25)** (-2.22)**
PFCl less 5.27** 5.90** 5.31** 5.86** 7.40** 7.15* 9.27**
PFC2 (1.33) (1.91) (1.86)" (1.17) (2.26)** (0.94) (1.36)
PC less 8.59*** 7.63*** 8.19*** 7.96*** 8.34*** 7.75** 9.36***
PFClC (3.56)*** (3.24)*** (3.26)*** (3.39)*** (3.24)*** (2.94)*** (2.73)***
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Table 4. Tests the Proportion of Financial Bidders
The table reports the proportion of financial bidders around partial acquisitions, control acquisitions, PP,
PFC, PC and PFCC. Partial acquisition is a sample which combined PP and PFC. Control acquisition
combined PC and PFCC. PP is pure partial (i.e., no partial acquisition or control acquisition occurs within
the two years following the partial acquisition). PFC is partial acquisition followed by a control one (i.e., a
partial acquisition followed by control acquisition within two years following the partial acquisition). PC is
a pure control acquisition (i.e., control acquisition where there was no prior partial acquisition of the target
within the last two years). PFCC is the same as PFC but at the time of control acquisition (i.e., the control
announcement is within two years after the partial announcement). The significance of the differences in
proportion between the different samples is based on z-statistic. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Sample Proportion of
Financial Bidders
Partial Acquisition (PA) 0.76









Table 5. Tests of the Differences in CARs between Financial and Non-Financial
Bidders
The table reports mean and median CARs for financial and non-financial bidders for various event
windows and various sub-samples. The Market Model approach with an estimation window of (-260,-21) is
used to obtain CARs. PP is pure partial (i.e., no partial acquisition or control acquisition occurs within the
two years following the partial acquisition). PFC is partial acquisition followed by a control one (i.e., a
partial acquisition followed by control acquisition within two years following the partial acquisition). PC is
a pure control acquisition (i.e., control acquisition where there was no prior partial acquisition of the target
within the last two years). Median CARs are reported in parentheses. The significance of the mean
differences from zero is based on Patell Z tests, while the significance of differences in means between
samples is based on /-tests. The significance of the median is based on the sign test. The significance of
differences on medians is based on nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank tests. ***, **, and * indicate













































































































Table 6. CARs around Partial and Control Acquisitions
The dependent variables are the CARs over the window (-1,+ I) days. In the second column the CARs is at
the time of partial acquisition and in the third column the CARs is at the time of control acquisition. The
market model approach with an estimation window of (-260,-21) is used to obtain CARs. Financial bidder
is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the SIC code of the bidder is between 6000 and 6999
inclusively and zero otherwise. PFC is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the partial
acquisition is followed by a control one (i.e., a partial acquisition followed by control acquisition within
two years following the partial acquisition) and zero otherwise. PFCC is a dummy variable which takes the
value of one if the control acquisition follow a partial acquisition within two years after the partial
acquisition (i.e., the control announcement is within two years after the partial announcement) and zero
otherwise. Percentage acquired is the percentage of shares the bidder acquired in this transaction. Stock is a
dummy variable which takes the value of one if stock was used as a medium of exchange and zero
otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of market capitalization of the target, which is calculated by
multiplying the number of shares outstanding with the price of the stock of the firm 60 days prior to the
announcement. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics
that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
CARs (-1,+I) at CARs (-1,+I) at














Firm size -0.004 -0.03
(-1.84)* (-7.09)***
Observations 1409 2224
Adjusted R-squared 0.08 0.05
Table 7. Predicting PFC
The dependent variable takes on a value of one if the partial acquisition is a PFC and zero if the partial
acquisition is a PP. PP is pure partial (i.e., no partial acquisition or control acquisition occurs within the two
years following the partial acquisition). PFC is partial acquisition followed by a control one (i.e., a partial
acquisition followed by control acquisition within two years following the partial acquisition). The
estimation is done using a logistic regression. Prior_CARs is the monthly CAR of the target firms estimated
from 60 month to 1 month before the partial announcement using the market adjusted model. CARs(-l,+ l)
is the CAR over the window (-1,+ I) days of the target firms. The market model approach with an
estimation window of (-260,-21) is used to obtain CARs (-1,+ I). Firm size is the natural logarithm of
market capitalization of the target, which is calculated by multiplying the number of shares outstanding
with the price of the stock of the firm 60 days prior to the announcement. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted
(White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and *












Table 8. Effects of Outside-Toehold versus Toehold on Target CARs
The dependent variable is the target CARs over the window (-1,+I). The market model approach with an
estimation window of (-260,-21) is used to obtain CARs. The second column shows the results when
outside-toehold calculation is based on two digits SIC codes, and the third column is based on three digits
SIC codes. OT2 (OT3) is a dummy variable which takes on a value of one if the target is an outside-toehold
based on two-digit (three-digit) SIC codes and zero if the partial is a toehold. Percentage acquired is the
percentage of shares the bidder acquired in this transaction. Firm size is the natural logarithm of market
capitalization of the target, which is calculated by multiplying the number of shares outstanding with the
price of the stock of the firm 60 days prior to the announcement. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White)
standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.







Percentage acquired 0.001 0.002
(1.67)* (1.88)*
Firm size -0.00 0.003
(-0.05) (1.88)*
Observations 364 182
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.02
Table 9. Effects of Óutside-Toehold on Target CARs in Pure Partial
The dependent variable is the target CARs of PP sample over the window (-1,+ I). The market model
approach with an estimation window of (-260,-21) is used to obtain CARs. PP is pure partial (i.e., no partial
acquisition or control acquisition occurs within the two years following the partial acquisition).The second
column shows the results when outside-toehold calculation is based on two-digit SIC codes, and the third
column is based on three-digit SIC codes. Outside-toehold is a dummy variable which takes on a value of
one if the target is an outside-toehold and zero otherwise. Percentage acquired is the percentage of shares
the bidder acquired in this transaction. Firm size is the natural logarithm of market capitalization of the
target, which is calculated by multiplying the number of shares outstanding with the price of the stock of
the firm 60 days prior to the announcement. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in
calculation of t- statistics that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.





Percentage acquired 0.002 0.003
(4.37)*** (4.42)* **
Firm size -0.003 -0.003
(-!.38) (-1.34)*
Observations 1409 1409
Adjusted R-squared 0 03 0.03
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Table 10. Mean and Median CARs of Bidder Firms
The table reports mean, median and the ratio of positive to negative CARs for various event windows and various sub-
samples. The market model approach with an estimation window of (-260,-21) is used to obtain CARs. BPP is bidder of
pure partial (i.e., no partial acquisition or control acquisition occurs within the two years following the partial acquisition).
BPFC is bidder of partial acquisition followed by a control one (i.e., there is a partial acquisition followed by control
acquisition within two years following the partial acquisition). BPC is bidder of pure control acquisition (i.e., control
acquisition where there was no prior partial acquisition of the target within the last two years). BPFCC is bidder of partial
acquisition followed by a control at the time of control acquisition. Median CARs are reported in parentheses. The ratio of
positive to negative CARs is reported in italics. The significance of the mean differences from zero is based on Patell Z tests,
while the significance of differences in means between samples is based on /-tests. The significance of the median is based on
the sign test. The significance of differences on medians is based on nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank tests. The
significance of the ratio of positive to negative CARs is based on the Generalized Sign Z. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
• .· . (-1,0) (0,+l) (0,0) (-1,+O (-·*,+3) (-5,+S) (-10,+1O)
B PP -0.39 -0.02 0.03 -0.44 -1.17* -0.69 0.80
(n=128) (-0.42) (-0.16) (-0.12) -(0.26) (-1.26) (-0.66) (0.41)
57:71 60:68 60:68 57:71 57:71 56:72 66:62
B_PFC 0.15 -0.46 0.32 -0.63 -1.63 -2.35 -1.54
(n=52) (-0.26) (0.02) (-0.17) (0.06) (-1.49) (-1.03) (-1.60)
22:30 26:26 25:27 27:25 21:31 25:27 24:28
B PC -1.26*** -1.53*** -1.24*** -1.55*** -1.65*** -1.40*** -1.38***
(n=1303) (-0.72)*** (-0.83)*** (-0.71)*** (-0.88)*** (-1.62)*** (-1.02)*** (-1.32)***
557:746*** 553:750*** 533:770*** 561:742*** 553:750*** 574:726** 582:721*
BPFCC -0.94*** -1.76*** -1.20*** -1.51*** -1.50** -1.39* -1.78*
(n=147) (-0.99)* (-0.69)* (-0.82)** (-0.98)* (-1.43)* (-1.02)* (-1.23)
63:84 62:85 58:88* 63:84 63:84 63:84 69:78
Differences
B_PCless -0.32 0.23 -0.04 -0.05 -0.16 -0.00 0.4
BPFCC (0.28) (-0.14) (0.09) (0.11) (-0.18) (0) (-0.08)
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Table 11. Mean and Median CARs of Toehold and Outside-Toehold Bidder Firms
at Control Offer
The table reports mean and median CARs for various event windows and various sub-samples at control
offer. The market model approach with an estimation window of (-260,-21) is used to obtain CARs.
BToehold is bidder with a toehold. BOutside-toehold is bidder with an outside-toehold.
BPCnonOutside-toehold is BPC who do not have an outside-toehold. BPC is bidder of pure control
acquisition (i.e., control acquisition where there was no prior partial acquisition of the target within the last
two years). Median CARs are reported in parentheses. The significance of the mean differences from zero
and the significance of differences in means between samples is based on i-tests. The significance of the
median is based on the sign test. The significance of differences on medians is based on nonparametric
Wilcoxon signed rank tests. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
(-1,0) (0,+l) (0,0) (-1,+I) (-3,+3) (-5,+5) (-10,+1O)
BToehoJd 0.15 -0.80 -0.49 -0.16 1.62 4.16 0.98
(n=22) (-0.54) (-0.75) (-0.69) (-0.81) (0.48) (1.21) (1.08)
B_Outside-toehold -1.54* -6.84 -1.39** -0.83 -0.94 0.13 -0.01
(n=34) (-1.16) (-0.35) (-1.05). (0.22) (-1.28) (0.36) (-0.61)
B_PC_non-Outside- -1.28 -1.56 -1.25 -1.58 -1.67 -1.45 -1.43
toehold(n=1260) (-0.70) (-0.84) (-0.71) (-0.87) (-1.60) (-1.04) (-1.46)
Differences
B_ Toehold less 0.62 -0.40 0.36 -1.03 1.76 0.85 1.69
B_Outside-toehold (0.44) (-0.34) (0.60) (-1.19) (1.93) (1.20) (1.72)
B_Outside-toehold less -0.27 0.88 -0.14 0.75 0.74 1.58 1.42
BPC non-Outside-
toehold (-0.46) (0.49). (-0.34) (1.09). (0.32) (1.40) (0.85)
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Table 12. Tests of the Differences in CARs and Offer Premium between PC and
PFC + PFCC
The table reports mean and median CARs for event window (-1,+I) and offer premiums for PP, PC, the
sum ofPFC and PFCC, and the difference between PC and the sum of PFC and PFCC. PC is a pure control
acquisition (i.e., control acquisition where there was no prior partial acquisition of the target within the last
two years). PFC is partial acquisition followed by a control offer (i.e., a partial acquisition followed by
control acquisition within two years of the partial acquisition). PFCC is the same as PFC but at the time of
control acquisition (i.e., the control announcement is within two years after the partial announcement). The
market model approach with an estimation window of (-260,-21) is used to obtain CARs. Offer premium is
the premium based on the price seven days before the announcement (as 1 week Premium). Offer premium.
60 is the premium based on the price 60 days before the announcement of the partial (pseudo partial in the
case of pure control bids). The significance of the differences in mean between PC and PFC+PFCC is
based on /-tests. The significance of the differences on median is based on nonparametric Wilcoxon signed
rank tests. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
PC PVCC PFC+PFCC DifferencePC HCC. IHHRL PC-(PFC+PFCC)
Mean CARs (-1,+I) 22.29
Median CARs (-1,+I) 17.93
Mean offer Premium one week 37. 1 6
Median offer Premium one week 25.49
Mean offer Premium_60 26.60
Median offer Premium^ 17.48
15.67
11.87
39.32
20.99
20.97
0
20.57
15.09
36.65
28.57
26.64
4.81
1.72
2.84*
0.52
-3.08*
-0.39
12.67***
